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This thesis grew out of a directed study held at the Naval Postgraduate School in 
the spring of 2016 that examined the current state of U.S. Army Psychological 
Operations (PSYOP). A group of PSYOP officers drew from their experiences, which 
included tactical deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan, regional rotations in three separate 
Geographic Combatant Commands (GCC), and other positions, to identify best practices 
and common challenges found in the PSYOP branch. In addition to making use of these 
insights the authors reviewed the past century of American influence operations. We 
looked at government documents as well as histories, some of which were written by 
those who participated in the action, some by more detached observers. We also took into 
account the testimony and statements made by contemporary officials and scholars. 
Our research findings confirmed observations made by serving PSYOP officers: 
there are several ways in which the U.S. government and the Department of Defense are 
failing to coordinate the conduct of influence operations. The government currently has 
no single organization leading the fight in the influence realm, and the U.S. Army’s 
Psychological Operations branch is not being used to its full potential. A look at recent 
re-organization efforts and how influence operations have been conducted reveal that this 
problem is not new. The most recent initiatives, to include efforts within the Department 
of State and the Department of Defense to establish entities responsible for conducting 
such operations, have faltered. 
In Chapter II we review the history of influence operations in the past century in 
order to provide context for PSYOP’s development. Chapter III discusses the current 
state of influence operations at the strategic level which sets the policy conditions for 
what is to be expected of PSYOP. In Chapter IV we review the current state of the U.S. 
Army Psychological Operations Regiment. Lastly, in Chapter V we present our 
recommendations for the reorganization of Psychological Operations in order that its 
potential strategic utility for influence operations be better harnessed.  
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II. THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF PSYCHOLOGICAL 
OPERATIONS 
1941—This is a task for the psychologist and social scientist rather than 
the orator. New and scientific methods of measuring and recording public 
opinion must be perfected. The ideals of democracy must be restated in 
fresh terms; the needs of today and tomorrow alike must be frankly faced 
and clearly defined; the nature of American history, traditions, and ideals 
must be made available in ways that increase realization.1 
1970—Yet, with the presence of an instant news and a world-information 
grid within which framework millions of people now live, fight, die, or 
survive, the U.S. government suffers from an impoverished, underfed 
international information program. It is tragically strange that in an era of 
continuing high national security costs and of continuing and sizable 
international commitments and programs, the psychological dimension of 
our international affairs remains largely fallow due to lack of properly 
applied funds, lack of insight, and lack of support.2 
2016—Congress may explore whether current organizational and doctrinal 
constructs support the full integration of these capabilities to maximize 
their effects, and whether ongoing conceptual confusion has inhibited the 
DOD’s ability to respond to [information warfare] challenges. Another 
consideration may be the efficacy of [information warfare] as a military 
function or a whole-of-government responsibility.3 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Edward Bernays, a young publicist at the time of the First World War, recalled 
hearing about the government’s establishment of the Committee on Public 
Information (CPI). “It was the first time the U.S. used ideas as weapons of war,’ he 
                                                 
1 Arthur Upham Pope, “The Importance of Morale,” Journal of Educational Sociology 15, no. 4 
(1941): 195–205. 
2 Edward L. Bernays and Burnet Hershey, eds., The Case for Reappraisal of U.S. Overseas 
Information Policies and Programs: Incorporating Congressman Fascell’s Report (New York: Praeger 
Publishers, 1970). 
3 Catherine A. Theohary and Kathleen J. McInnis, Information Warfare: Russian Activities (CRS 
Insight No. IN10563) (Washington, D.C. Congressional Research Service, 2016), 2–3, 
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/IN10563.pdf.  
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recalled.”4 Mr. Bernays went on to become a legendary figure in the field of public 
relations, working for both the U.S. government and the private sector and promoting the 
discipline of public relations as an outgrowth of social science. Though he is most widely 
recognized for his accomplishments in the commercial industry, he was instrumental in 
the conduct of what we will term influence operations, using his talents to promote 
American strategic interests in World War I, World War II, and the Cold War.5 
Interviewed on his 100th birthday in 1991, Mr. Bernays recounted some specific tactics of 
a WWI influence operation and recalled his realization that “if this could be used for war, 
it can be used for peace.”6 Since WWI, the Army’s capability to conduct influence 
operations through its PSYOP branch has developed against the backdrop of other 
government agencies responsible for influence operations coming and going as dictated 
by necessity and political will. 
American politicians, bureaucrats, and military leaders have struggled for the last 
hundred years to determine the most effective methods of using information to influence 
the behavior of foreign audiences while keeping their domestic audiences informed but 
not unduly influenced. This tightrope walk of using information to achieve strategic aims 
on one hand, while maintaining openness in political discourse on the other has proved 
problematic time and again. It is a challenge for the U.S. government as a whole and the 
Department of Defense in particular, especially the U.S. Army Psychological Operations 
branch. Experiences in World War I, World War II, the Cold War, and other conflicts 
reflect a pattern of a significant amount of attention paid to influence operations when the 
nation is under threat and a waning of that attention during more peaceful times. As our 
                                                 
4 Glen Rifkin, “The Media Business; At 100, Public Relations’ Pioneer Criticizes Some of His Heirs,” 
New York Times, December 30, 1991. 
5 Influence Operations: For the purposes of this study we are using the term influence operations to 
include both Public Diplomacy (PD) and Psychological Operations (PSYOP), also known as Military 
Information Support Operations (MISO). We believe that these two activities should not be separated, but 
need to be coordinated at the strategic level. Influence operations include other components, but we focus 
on PD and PSYOP due to overlap between them. In our experience, as both practitioners and students of 
this topic, we have seen instances of PD and PSYOP being coordinated in the US embassies where they 
host a Military Information Support Team (MIST). This relationship benefits both parties as the programs 
undertaken by either entity cannot achieve U.S. strategic goals without influence operations being mutually 
crafted and supported. 
6 Rifkin, “The Media Business.” 
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nation has struggled with the appropriate use of the weapons of influence that have been 
developed over the past century, other global actors have forged ahead without wrestling 
with questions of propriety. Confronting this new reality, the United States must have 
properly devised policies and organizations in order to competently defend against the 
influence operations of hostile states or non-state actors. 
B. THE FIRST WORLD WAR 
Influence operations have been a part of military culture since the ancient world, 
through the Middle Ages, and into modernity. When the Tartars catapulted rotting, 
diseased bodies into the besieged city of Caffa in 1346,7 this undoubtedly had a 
psychological as well as a biological effect. Since the Revolutionary War, the United 
States has used information to shape perceptions and gain a military advantage.  General 
George Washington has been credited as a master of using psychological ploys and 
deception in his campaigns against the British. Given their relative strength, compared to 
the British, the colonists used information successfully to portray the British as brutal 
oppressors, thereby gaining popular support.8 Modern American influence operations 
began in World War I. Influence operations during the First World War were managed by 
the Committee on Public Information (CPI), more commonly known as the Creel 
Committee. The Secretaries of State, War, and Navy sat on the committee, which was 
chaired by a journalist friend of President Wilson, George Creel.  
Formed in April of 1917, the Creel Committee coordinated the activities of a 
myriad of associations, industries, and organizations for the purposes of supporting the 
nation’s strategic aim of winning the war. Filmmakers, songwriters, advertisers, public 
speakers, cartoonists, alumni associations, and manufacturing guilds all contributed their 
talents to the cause and their products to the committee’s representatives for approval.9 
                                                 
7 Mark Wheelis, “Biological Warfare at the 1346 Siege of Caffa,” Emerging Infectious Diseases 8, no. 
9 (September 2002): 971–75. 
8 Robert J. Kodosky, Psychological Operations American Style: The Joint United States Public Affairs 
Office, Vietnam and Beyond (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2007). 
9 James Robert Mock and Cedric Larson, Words that Won the War: The Story of the Committee on 
Public Information, 1917–1919 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1939), 66–74. 
 6 
This was an all-hands, whole of government approach, at least in the eyes of the 
committee. 
Despite the widespread reach of the CPI and the wholehearted support its efforts 
received from many quarters, the diplomatic corps and elements in Congress were 
decidedly unenthusiastic.10 Many members of Congress distrusted Mr. Creel due to his 
close relationship with President Wilson, and he returned the sentiment in public 
statements, disparaging those Congressmen who did not fully support the CPI.11 The far-
reaching activities of the committee did prompt a House Appropriations Committee 
investigation, a drastic reduction in the CPI’s budget, and the closing of most CPI offices 
not long after the cessation of hostilities. 
While the Committee on Public Information successfully raised public support for 
American involvement in World War I and developed many techniques that would serve 
influence professionals in future years, COL (Ret) Paul Linebarger, a World War II 
Psychological Warfare specialist, notes the distaste for propaganda that was the Creel 
Committee’s legacy: 
America emerged from the war disappointed at home and discredited 
abroad—so far as the heated propaganda of “making the world safe for 
democracy” was concerned. A more modest, more calculated national 
propaganda effort would have helped forestall those attitudes … Creel and 
his fellow workers did not remember that beyond every war there lies a 
peace, in its own way as grim and difficult as war.12 
With the CPI responsible for conducting influence operations in the civil sector 
during World War I, some within the armed forces began to see the utility of propaganda 
to help achieve military objectives. Individuals within the Military Intelligence Section, 
War Department General Staff undertook informal steps to plan and conduct influence 
                                                 
10 Thomas Sorenson, The Word War: The Story of American Propaganda (New York: Harper and 
Row, 1968), 6. 
11 Kodosky, Psychological Operations American Style; Sorenson, The Word War, 6; Sorenson, The 
Word War, 6. 
12 Paul Myron Anthony Linebarger, Psychological Warfare (Washington: Combat Forces Press, 
2016). 
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operations.13 But the idea didn’t gain momentum until Heber Blankenhorn, a journalist 
whose friends had tried to recruit him for the CPI, “became a firm believer in the efficacy 
of propaganda”14 and began discussing his ideas for using propaganda (the word had not 
yet gained the negative connotations of later years)15 for military purposes. His proposals 
for “combat propaganda, intelligence collection, the study of enemy civilian and military 
morale, and counter-propaganda” were compelling enough to earn him a direct 
commission into the Army as the captain in charge of the propaganda unit.16 First called 
the Psychologic Subsection of the Military Intelligence Branch, Blankenhorn’s outfit was 
eventually designated G-2-D, Allied Expeditionary Force. 
As with today’s Psychological Operations Branch, the G-2-D sought personnel 
with cultural and linguistic acumen. It took several weeks to work out the unit’s mission 
and purpose; the role of a military organization doing influence work had to be 
established, as did its relationship with the CPI. Ultimately, Army and Administration 
leaders decided that the unit belonged under military control and would be used for 
military purposes. Foreshadowing debates held in the ensuing decades, Secretary of War 
Newton Baker “insisted that the Army ‘not drop just anybody's handbills’ nor be a CPI 
‘messenger boy.’”17 
The messages that G-2-D sent were varied, but focused on weakening the 
enemy’s willingness to fight and lowering morale. The unit distributed millions of 
leaflets in “tactical campaigns of a strictly military nature aimed at securing immediate 
results.”18 Though the leaflets fell short of relaying the ideals of Wilson’s Fourteen 
                                                 
13 Clayton D. Laurie, ““The Chanting of Crusaders’: Captain Heber Blankenhorn and AEF Combat 
Propaganda in World War I,” Journal of Military History 59, no. 3 (1995): 457–82. 
14 Ibid., 461. 
15 Elmer Davis, describing the mission of his Office of Wartime Information in 1943, outlined how 
Adolph Hitler, as a recipient of Allied propaganda in the First World War, adopted and refined propaganda 
techniques to such an extent that they became closely associated with fascism and totalitarianism. Mr. 
Davis acknowledged that “‘Propaganda’ is a word in bad odor in this country” (Elmer Davis, “OWI Has a 
Job,” Public Opinion Quarterly 7, no. 1 (1943): 5–14). 
16 Laurie, “‘The Chanting of Crusaders.’” 
17 Ibid., 464. 
18 Kodosky, Psychological Operations American Style, 59. 
 8 
Points that Blankenhorn had hoped to use against the enemy, they were effective enough 
to draw the attention of the German General Staff. General Erich Ludendorff 
characterized Allied propaganda as “exceptionally clever” work that “hypnotized” 
Germany, and another official wrote that it “had shaken the foundations of the Central 
Powers in a way impossible with conventional military forces.” 19  
The G-2-D’s leaflets set the pattern for military influence operations in years to 
come, focusing on the tactical level of war with surrender appeals and morale-weakening 
messages. At the war’s end, the unit was quickly dismantled, and its personnel sent 
elsewhere. As an organization, G-2-D was shifted within sections of the Army’s Military 
Intelligence Division, but ceased to exist by 1925. “G-2-D was quickly forgotten during 
the interwar years,” and the lessons learned during the Great War would have to be 
learned again.20 
Following World War I, men like George Creel, Edward Bernays, and Heber 
Blankenhorn went back to marketing, public relations, or journalism and civilian life, 
often honing the skills they had practiced while supporting the nation’s strategic aims. 
Propaganda and using tools of influence over the masses became the purview of 
communist, fascist, and totalitarian governments, while the United States government left 
developments in these and associated fields to the private sector. U.S. concern with 
influence began to increase only as Nazi Germany made inroads in Latin America and 
Europe. Only then did President Roosevelt and his administration see the need for 
organizations to conduct influence operations, both at home and abroad. 
C. THE SECOND WORLD WAR 
 Many organizations, in various agencies and departments, were established and 
disestablished in the period preceding America’s entry into World War II. Tellingly, one 
of Linebarger’s diagrams depicting influence organizations in the early war years 
                                                 
19 Mark Cornwall, The Undermining of Austria-Hungary: The Battle for Hearts and Minds, (New 
York: St. Martin’s Press Inc., 2000), 223. 
20 Laurie, ““The Chanting of Crusaders.’” 
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(Figure 1) includes a block labeled “Anybody Who Felt Like Trying.”21 The civil 
organizations that endured, both the Office of War Information (OWI) and the Office of 
Strategic Services (OSS), were established in 1942.22 
 
Figure 1.  “Anybody Who Felt Like Trying”23 
  
                                                 
21 Linebarger, Psychological Warfare, 92. 
22 Alfred H. Paddock, U.S. Army Special Warfare: Its Origins, rev. ed. (Lawrence, KS: University 
Press of Kansas, 2002), 4. 
23 Linebarger, Psychological Warfare, 92. 
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The Office of War Information was headed by Elmer Davis, a journalist 
appointed to the post by President Roosevelt. Mr. Davis considered his agency an 
important part of the war effort, and related its mission to the psychological warfare 
actions of Ghengis Khan, Benjamin Franklin, and contemporary fascist enemies.24 
Because those enemies used propaganda so extensively, many officials were skeptical 
and reluctant to create a single body to conduct influence operations. But the need to 
coordinate the use of information for strategic purposes became increasingly obvious. 
Prior to the June 1942 formation of the OWI, several disparate organizations had been 
given mandates to use information and conduct influence operations. The extent of those 
operations and the audiences involved varied according to the agency, as did attitudes 
regarding the mission and the manner in which it was to be conducted. The Office of 
Facts and Figures (established October 1941), for example, was headed by the poet 
Archibald Macleish and staffed by men of literature and letters dedicated to “explain[ing] 
to Americans why the United States would have to fight the coming war.”25 The Office 
of Government Reports (established July 1939) likewise concerned itself with a domestic 
audience, conducting liaison activities between the federal government and state 
governments and the general public.26 Influence operations directed at audiences outside 
of the United States came under the purview of the Coordinator of Information (COI, 
established July 1941), specifically the Foreign Information Service office. These three 
organizations, along with the Division of Information from the Office of Emergency 
Management, moved into and formed the core of the OWI. Figure 2 illustrates the 
transformation of varied agencies into the OWI organization. 
                                                 
24 Davis, “OWI Has a Job,” 6. 
25 Sydney Weinberg, “What to Tell America: The Writers’ Quarrel in the Office of War Information,” 
Journal of American History 55, no. 1 (1968): 76. 
26 Lester G. Hawkins Jr. and George S. Pettee, “OWI—Organization and Problems,” Public Opinion 
Quarterly 7, no. 1 (1943): 16. 
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Figure 2.  Formation of the OWI27 
                                                 
27 Linebarger, Psychological Warfare, 95. 
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Like the Creel Committee, the OWI leveraged communicators from industry, 
filmmakers, radio broadcasters, journalists, artists, and writers. As director, Elmer Davis 
was dedicated to using truthful information as a weapon; he disdained lies and outright 
manipulation of information to suit a message’s purpose. This philosophy applied 
whether the audience was domestic or foreign. In addition to communicating to the 
American public, Davis had the OWI direct its efforts towards four distinct audiences 
overseas: “the enemy, our Allies in both the free and the occupied nations, neutral 
countries, and the American armed forces outside the continental limits of the United 
States.”28 The OWI maintained close cooperation with the military information services, 
primarily for the purposes of building morale among the troops. 
The head of the Office of Strategic Services, Colonel William Donovan, sought to 
use information quite differently from his civilian counterpart at the OWI. Colonel 
Donovan envisioned influence operations that drew heavily on intelligence and would 
use the knowledge gained to conduct operations directed against enemy propaganda and 
military capabilities. His pre-OSS experience as the Coordinator of Information reflects 
this, as he first established that organization’s intelligence capability, then set about 
creating its propaganda division, the Foreign Information Service.29 
For Donovan, the role of propaganda was “as a weapon of deception and 
subversion, [which] should be under military supervision.”30 This put him at odds with 
his FIS chief, whose views were more in line with those of Davis and MacLeish. 
President Roosevelt’s Executive Order creating the OWI settled the matter; “COI became 
OSS and FIS became a division of the Office of War Information.”31 This change also 
put the newly created OSS under the authority of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, where 
“Donovan continued to assume some psychological warfare functions for his Office of 
                                                 
28 Davis, “OWI Has a Job,” 11. 
29 Edward Hymoff, The OSS in World War II (New York: Ballantine Books, 2016), 45. 
30 Paddock, U.S. Army Special Warfare, 5, quoting Corey Ford. 
31 Hymoff, The OSS in World War II, 46. 
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Strategic Services.”32 These functions, according to Linebarger, were intelligence, black 
propaganda operations, and subversive operations.33 The OSS continued these activities 
throughout the war. 
While the government’s influence operations-related organizations underwent 
various permutations on the way toward the establishment of the OWI and OSS, elements 
within the military were also working toward a dedicated influence operations capability. 
There had been none since the G-2-D was disbanded after the First World War, and only 
one serving officer, Colonel Charles Mason, had wartime experience in influence 
operations.34 Mason’s efforts to generate interest in redeveloping those capabilities went 
unheeded. The rekindling of an interest in influence came instead from a civilian, 
Assistant Secretary of War John McCloy, who had the War Department’s assistant chief 
of staff, G-2 form a group to study the subject. The study group, not surprisingly, 
reported that there were no concerted efforts to analyze or counteract enemy propaganda. 
Following this 1941 study, the Military Intelligence Service (MIS) eventually 
established a Psychological Warfare Branch under Colonel Oscar Solbert, but 
With the establishment of OWI, Colonel Solbert’s office fissiparated like 
an amoeba; the civilian half of Psychological Warfare Branch, with a few 
officers, went over to OWI to be a brain-trust for the foreign broadcast 
experts, who failed to welcome this accession of talent; the military half 
remained as an MIS agency until 31 December, 1943, when OWI 
abolished its half and MIS cooperated by wiping out the other, leaving the 
War Department in the middle of a war with no official psychological 
warfare agency whatever, merely some liaison officers.35 
Linebarger, who was a staff officer detailed from the War Department to OWI, recounts 
that the organizational confusion described above continued through the first years of the 
war until it had become, by 1945, “a large, well run, well-integrated organization.”36 
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Paddock also describes territorial battles among agencies, describing at least four general 
staff-level committees that studied how best to approach influence operations. Both 
authors note that the lack of coordinated planning at the highest levels left much of the 
work of influence operations to theater-level commands, per a JCS directive that predated 
the dissolution of the Psychological Warfare Branch.  
It was this latitude at the theater level that allowed Brigadier General Robert 
McClure to develop the influence operations capabilities that eventually led to the 
modern U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF). In 1942, after having served as military 
attaché to several exiled European governments in London, McClure took charge of the 
newly created Information and Censorship Section (INC) of the Allied Force 
Headquarters (AFHQ).  In this position, he “consolidate[d] several functions for which 
most Army officers had little preparation: public relations, censorship, and psychological 
warfare – the latter organized into a psychological warfare branch.”37 Later, in 1944, 
General Eisenhower appointed McClure the director of the Psychological Warfare 
Division of the Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force (PWD/SHAEF), a 
position from which he (and deputies representing the OWI and OSS as well as two 
British civilian agencies) controlled and coordinated influence operations throughout the 
European theater.38 Top commanders such as General George Patton acknowledged that 
PWD’s tactical successes, with hundreds of thousands of leaflet-inspired German troops 
having surrendered and enemy morale severely diminished, contributed to the Allied 
victory: “psychological warfare had an important place in the European Command. It can 
accomplish much good.”39   
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D. THE COLD WAR  
The OWI was shut down shortly after World War II. This reflected Elmer Davis’ 
conception of the office as lasting only ‘for the duration’ of the mission. Davis believed 
OWI, while critical during the war, had no role to play afterward.40 In contrast, 
Donovan’s OSS continued to conduct both influence and intelligence operations. The end 
of the war brought significant administrative turmoil to the U.S. government as wartime 
agencies like the OWI were decommissioned. Members of the public and the government 
saw a need to continue some activities that had been initiated during the war; Donovan, 
for instance, went to considerable lengths to ensure that the intelligence-gathering 
functions of the OSS were established in a new national agency.41 But, significantly, 
neither he nor anyone else in government made a similar effort toward forming an agency 
to conduct influence operations, at least not immediately following the war.  
The task of communicating the United States’ messages to the world fell instead 
to the State Department, which had inherited Voice of America and other radio broadcast 
responsibilities upon the dissolution of the OWI. Government information services were 
largely perceived as wartime measures, though, and the American public (and members 
of Congress) were wary of having any agency conduct information, much less influence, 
operations. These misgivings grew as the Department of State (DOS) expanded its 
cultural and educational exchanges in the years following the war, with some 
considerable consternation created by DOS’s funding of art exhibitions which some 
thought did not fairly represent American ideals or values.42 
In 1948, the Congress approved the U.S. Information and Educational Exchange 
Act (Public Law 402; 80th Congress), popularly known as the Smith-Mundt Act, 
“because the progress of the Cold War convinced Congress that the United States 
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Government needed to engage in international information and educational exchange 
activities on a global scale.”43 In actuality, the act codified the misgivings that many felt 
regarding the establishment of an agency to conduct influence operations and limited the 
extent of these activities. “Americans insisted that government efforts at persuasion at 
home…should remain benign, affirming their popular belief that government should not 
be the guardian of the public conscience.”44 The Smith-Mundt Act authorized the 
creation of an information service and an educational exchange service, but it did not 
specify the organization or agency responsible for overseeing those programs. The five 
years following the passage of Smith-Mundt saw multiple organizations and agencies 
proposed (or even temporarily created and staffed) as the government moved toward the 
creation of an organization that would take ownership of existing information-related 
programs, such as the Voice of America (VOA),  and be responsible for new ones. 
The need for such an organization was made clear by the actions of the Soviet 
Union, which actively sought to spread communist ideology.45 Unfortunately, 
international communism, or the fear of it, made the creation of a new influence 
organization more difficult, as many of the intellectuals and artists who staffed the 
various precursor agencies were regarded with suspicion by Senator Joseph McCarthy 
and others. Several inquiries into exactly how the nation conducted its influence 
operations were capped by President Eisenhower’s creation of the President’s Committee 
on International Information Activities, better known as the Jackson Committee (after its 
chair, former Deputy Director of Central Intelligence William Jackson).46 The Jackson 
committee presented its recommendations to the president at the end of June, 1953, and, 
on August 3rd, Eisenhower created the organization that would conduct the nation’s 
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influence operations for nearly fifty years:  the United States Information Agency 
(USIA).   
The mission of the USIA, as given to the new agency by President Eisenhower, 
was: 
To submit evidence to peoples of other nations by means of 
communication techniques that the objectives and policies of the United 
States are in harmony with and will advance their legitimate aspirations 
for freedom, progress, and peace.47 
The agency would do this through a variety of techniques under the direction of Theodore 
Streibert, a businessman with experience in the film and radio broadcasting industries 
who had also been an overseas consultant to the Voice of America. The new USIA 
director sat, at the president’s request, on the Operations Coordinating Board, a policy-
making group chaired by the Undersecretary of State which included the heads or 
undersecretaries of Defense, the Foreign Aid Agency, and the CIA, “a compact group 
attending weekly luncheon meetings,” Mr. Streibert later recalled.48 The fact that he also 
had a monthly personal meeting with the president attests to the importance that the new 
agency held for the Eisenhower administration. 
From the beginning, the USIA drew on expertise from other government agencies 
and the private sector. Legacy programs such as periodical publishing, overseas libraries, 
radio and television broadcasting, and film distribution, which had been managed by an 
alphabet soup of entities in the years prior to the establishment of USIA were all 
subsumed into the agency. Streibert was a proponent of involving “American business, 
labor, and other nongovernmental services”49 in USIA’s activities; he was assisted in this 
effort by Edward Bernays, who, as a private-sector public relations expert, headed the 
National Committee for an Adequate U.S. Overseas Information Program, a 28-member 
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group of industry leaders who supported the fledgling agency.50 This integration of 
government agencies, non-governmental organizations, and private sector support 
mirrored, for the Cold War, the type of national effort that was made during the world 
wars. However, one difference was that the ideological struggle with the Soviet Union 
was fought on very different battlefields, for a much longer time, and on a larger scale.   
Though the USIA was seated in Washington, DC, and its bureaucratic and 
administrative activities there were vital to the organization’s existence and success, the 
bulk of the agency’s work was done by its Foreign Service Officers (FSO) working in the 
field overseas, where the agency was known as the United States Information Service 
(USIS). These men and women made the vital cultural connections that enabled them to 
understand how to relate to and reach their target audiences. In this, they were aided by 
Foreign Service Nationals (FSN), local partners who made up the bulk of the agency’s 
overseas work force.51 Together, the FSOs and FSNs organized and executed influence 
operations such as: 
• The 1959 American National Exhibition in Moscow, which became 
famous for the Nixon-Khrushchev “kitchen debate.”52 
• Educational and feature films that were the first Vietnamese-language 
films ever made.53 
• Lectures and tours by countless American writers, poets, artists, and 
performers. 
• “During [the Cuban Missile Crisis], USIA was present at the highest level 
policy-making group, and the Agency did a magnificent job of supporting 
U.S. policy”54 by making recommendations on how to communicate the 
U.S. position to the world. 
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• Publication of comic strips, books, and magazines on a variety of topics 
(e.g.-language, travel, political science); one series, Problems of 
Communism, was published continuously for forty years.55 
• Sporting events and overseas visits by champion American athletes, 
“coaches, sports administrators, and sports medicine specialists.”56 
The Cold War was not the USIA’s only concern during its 46 years as the nation’s 
primary influence operations agency. During the Vietnam War, the fighting was hot, and 
the USIA, relying on its years of experience working with a variety of local partners to 
counteract communist influence, stepped into the fray. As the war in Vietnam escalated 
in the early 1960s and counterinsurgency emerged as the primary means of fighting the 
war, both military and civil leaders recognized the need for coordinated influence 
operations. While military efforts in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) increased, “the role 
played by the USIA expanded as well.”57 In early 1965, the leaders of the U.S. Agency 
for International Development’s Communications Media Division (one of USIA’s 
partners), the military’s psychological operations directorate, and USIA’s Saigon bureau 
devised a partnership which was proposed to the National Security Council by the USIA 
director.58 The result was the Joint United States Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO), a 
unique combination of civilian agency and Army personnel responsible for “nothing 
more—and nothing less—than the whole process of communications in a wartime 
situation.”59 
The ranks of USIA personnel in Vietnam swelled as the mission drew FSOs from 
other countries around the globe. As many as a third of the USIA personnel “went into 
direct psychological operations in support of massive ‘pacification’ and ‘Revolutionary 
Development’ programs”60 where they worked side by side with U.S Army PSYOP 
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personnel in dangerous and remote areas. The JUSPAO also worked with the RVN’s 
Vietnamese Information Service (VIS), though these local partners did not execute the 
mission with as much vigor or expertise as their American counterparts expected.61 
Unfortunately, over the course of the war, the JUSPAO’s focus turned from 
influencing local audiences to efforts to assist American and foreign journalists in their 
reporting of the war. This led to a separation among the military mission, psychological 
operations aimed at pacifying the population, and JUSPAO’s focus on public relations.62 
By 1966, the USIA director (Leonard Marks, at that time) decided it would be best for the 
agency to distance itself from “psywarfare” and leave that portion of the influence 
operation effort to the military.63 The JUSPAO continued operations in Vietnam until the 
end of the war, and was instrumental in the Chieu Hoi returnee program, aimed at 
inducing Vietcong fighters to defect. The program’s policies were centrally planned, but 
field organizations planned its operations. Over the course of five years (1966-71), the 
Chieu Hoi program neutralized about one-fifth as many VC as were killed or captured 
during the same period.64 
When assessing JUSPAO, the USIA concluded: 
There is no U.S. government agency truly qualified and staffed to conduct 
psychological operations in a war of this size. USIA comes closest, but to 
do its job properly requires men and money far in excess of what is 
available in “peacetime.”65 
The melding of civil and military influence operations in the Joint United States Public 
Affairs Office led to difficulties for all concerned, chief among them a loss of credibility 
in the eyes of the domestic and foreign press. Following the Vietnam War, the USIA 
reoriented itself to its other ongoing influence operations around the world, and PSYOP 
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fieldcraft withered. In fact, the 1990 Department of Defense Psychological Master Plan 
noted that “The end of the United States' involvement in the Vietnam War marked the 
beginning of a decade-long period of decline and atrophy of military psychological 
operations (PSYOP) capabilities.”66 
The USIA continued its efforts through the era of détente and into the 1980s, with 
the broadcasts of the Voice of America and Radio Liberty piercing the heart and soul of 
the communist world. Puddington holds that these broadcasts were “one of the most 
successful institutions of America’s Cold War effort, and made an important contribution 
to the peaceful nature of communism’s demise.”67 When the Berlin Wall fell in 
November of 1989, USIA ensured that this news was disseminated via all of its media 
outlets. This also turned out to be the agency’s death knell. The Eastern Bloc countries 
opened their borders with the West and the Soviet Union broke apart within a few years. 
Ten year later, the USIA was folded into the State Department, and the Voice of America 
(VOA) and other broadcast outlets became part of the independent Broadcasting Board of 
Governors (BBG).68 Just as it had occurred during the period between the world wars, as 
well as during the brief lull following the Second World War, absent a foe, the United 
States no longer seemed to feel the need to concern itself with influence operations.69 
E. CONCLUSION 
Over the past century of American involvement in open conflict and Cold War, 
one sees in the nation’s use of influence operations several recurring patterns.  
• Washington will increase use of influence operations when the United 
States faces a clear enemy and quickly decrease or stop using them when 
open hostilities diminish. 
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• Americans dislike the very idea of using influence operations, shying 
away from the word ‘propaganda.’ 
• High-echelon leaders and agencies struggle to construct and adhere to a 
unified effort when it comes to both organization and message. 
• Military expertise in influence operations is underutilized, often invested 
in surrender appeals and the undermining of enemy morale but little else.   
Despite the potential benefits of well-planned and well-executed influence 
operations, leaders seem reluctant to fully support organizations capable of conducting 
them. In 1943, Elmer Davis laid out the Office of Wartime Information’s mission by 
saying “to Allied countries and the occupied nations we have to tell the story of what 
America is doing and what America is getting ready to do, to tell them the story of 
American production and to make them realize that we are going to win.”70 Worth noting 
is that no one recently (2016) has made an equivalent statement regarding the mission of 
influence professionals. Perhaps this is because, fifteen years into the Global War on 
Terror, we no longer see ourselves facing the kind of threat that prompted formation of 
Creel’s CPI or Davis’ OWI? 
In his history of Special Warfare, Paddock notes that it is often the “intervention 
of senior governmental civilians [which prods] hesitant and cautious uniformed Army 
leaders into taking action on concepts of an unconventional nature.”71 One has to 
wonder: where is the desire today on the part of civilian leaders to push (or enable) the 
military to unleash the full potential of the influence operations organizations it already 
possesses? 
Writing about the formation of the USIA in 1953, Rubin remarks that concepts 
about information programs at the time were “defensive” and the programs were 
perceived as “a holding action.”72 These attitudes obviously changed as the Cold War 
with the Soviet Union progressed, with the USIA becoming more or less aggressive as 
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international relations warranted. Today, the United States has no such entity and lacks a 
national influence operations agency, even though the Jackson Committee noted over half 
a century ago that “there is a ‘psychological’ aspect or implication to every diplomatic, 
economic, or military policy and action” and that those aspects or implications need to be 
considered and coordinated for maximum advantage.73  
Testifying before the House of Representatives in 1968, with over half a century 
of influence operations experience, both public and private, behind him, Edward Bernays 
exhorted policymakers to reevaluate and overhaul USIA’s policies and practices. He 
specifically recommended establishing “immediate, intermediate, and long-range 
programs” based on social science; research on national psychologies, attitudes, and 
culture as the basis for action; strategies informed by social sciences; and tactics 
following objectives, research, and strategy.74 A half century after his testimony, it seems 
curious that no one has echoed Bernays, particularly given all the places the United States 
is fighting today. 
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III. FURTHER LOSS OF FOCUS SINCE THE DISSOLUTION OF 
THE USIA 
A. A QUESTION OF TERMS 
There has not been a successfully sustained coordinated effort to synchronize 
strategic influence operations at the national level since the dissolution of the USIA in 
1999.75 While the USIA was not a perfect organization, it provided the government with 
an agency to coordinate the use of information as an element of national power in ways 
that other departments could not. The Departments of State and Defense both use 
information to conduct some types of influence operations, but they have other primary 
missions. During the Cold War, when the USIA was active, the United States’ rivalry 
with the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) enabled the drawing of 
a stark contrast between the United States and its communist rivals. Since the fall of the 
Soviet Union, the U.S. has lacked a clear adversary against whom it could develop a 
politically palatable narrative. The USIA was shuttered once large scale U.S. strategic 
influence efforts were no longer thought to be necessary. This movement away from the 
concept of conducting influence operations has been reflected by shifts in the 
terminology that government entities use to refer to the subject. 
One potential bright spot for anyone who believed the U.S. government still 
needed a coherent strategy for influence operations was the introduction of the now-
defunct term, Strategic Communications. Officially approved for Department of Defense 
(DOD) use in December of 2006, the definition of Strategic Communications was:   
focused US Government efforts to understand and engage key audiences 
in order to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable for the 
advancement of US Government interests, policies, and objectives through 
the use of coordinated programs, plans, themes, messages, and products 
synchronized with the actions of all instruments of national power.76 
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The adoption of the term Strategic Communications and the acknowledgement of the 
importance of synchronizing among all instruments of national power shows that there 
were at least some in the Department of Defense who believed in influence operations at 
a strategic level. 
However, Strategic Communications never achieved a prominent place in DOD, 
fell out of favor in 2012, and no longer exists in the U.S. government’s lexicon. Some 
have described the cessation of using the term as a victory for senior Public Affairs 
officials. As senior DOD official, Rosa Brooks, described the skirmish, it was:  
between those who believe that strategic communication is merely an 
unnecessary euphemism for “communications”—meaning, basically, press 
statements and talking points—and thus should be controlled by public 
affairs offices, and those who believe strategic communication is a 
confusing term, but one that has nonetheless come to stand for something 
complex and important, something that has more to do with strategy than 
with communications.77  
The emergence of the term Strategic Communications and then its quick demise 
demonstrate that there truly is a difference between what senior officials say is important 
and what actually happens.  
Interestingly, however, NATO still uses the term Strategic Communications and 
has a specific office called the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence. 
NATO defines Strategic Communications as “the coordinated and appropriate use of 
NATO communications activities and capabilities in support of Alliance policies, 
operations and activities, and in order to advance NATO's aims.”78 The core capabilities 
to conduct NATO Strategic Communications are Public Diplomacy, Public Affairs, 
Military Public Affairs, Information Operations, and Psychological Operations.79 With 
NATO being such an important U.S. partner, and Strategic Communications being 
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relevant to NATO, why is Strategic Communications not good enough for the U.S. 
Government lexicon? At a minimum, we might ensue by saying that strategic influence 
operations are in disarray across the U.S. government, that reengaging in the debate about 
Strategic Communications would be worthwhile. 
“Information Warfare” is another popular term that has no formal definition in 
DOD doctrine or the government lexicon. In his essay entitled “What is Information 
Warfare?,” Martin C. Libicki argues there is no inclusive definition for Information 
Warfare, but offers seven distinct forms of Information Warfare.80 While, according to 
Libicki, Information Warfare includes PSYOP, we believe that Public Diplomacy could 
also be included as a component of Information Warfare. This problem of what should be 
included under Information Warfare is not new, as a recent Congressional Research 
Service Insight makes clear:  
Congress may explore whether current organizational and doctrinal 
constructs support the full integration of these [information warfare] 
capabilities to maximize their effects, and whether ongoing conceptual 
confusion has inhibited DOD’s ability to respond to [information warfare] 
challenges. Another consideration may be the efficacy of [information 
warfare] as a military function or a whole-of-government responsibility.81 
At least according to the CRS, Information Warfare is not solely a DOD function and 
other U.S. government departments and agencies are necessary to effectively wage 
Information Warfare. 
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B. CURRENT SYNCHRONIZER OF INFLUENCE OPERATIONS 
Senior officials in the DOD acknowledge the necessity of synchronizing 
operations in the information environment at the strategic level. In a recent hearing on 
PSYOP before the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) on October 22, 2015 the 
then Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, 
Michael D. Lumpkin, stated: 
Whereas lethal and destructive combat capabilities tend to belong 
exclusively to the Department [of Defense], other U.S. government 
departments and agencies, such as the Broadcasting Board of Governors 
and the Department of State, have capabilities, roles, and missions as part 
of our government’s strategic communications efforts.82 
He highlighted the unique challenges faced by the PSYOP force and stated that, in the 
information environment, the Department of Defense often serves in a supporting role to 
the Department of State. Furthermore, he emphasized the need for “close interagency 
coordination and clear delineation of the appropriate roles for each organization.”83 
While Mr. Lumpkin touted the need for coordination at a strategic level and briefly 
mentioned a “framework” whereby the coordination should happen, he offered little 
detail.  
It has been our operational experience that interactions between the Department 
of Defense and Department of State for strategic influence occur at the tactical level in 
response to a crisis rather than proactively, as part of pre-planned strategic engagement. 
As of this writing, a national influence strategy has not been published. In the absence of 
such a strategy, it is impossible to gain unity of effort among disparate organizations 
conducting influence operations. 
One specific organization that Mr. Lumpkin mentioned in his testimony before 
the HASC was the Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications (CSCC), 
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housed within the Department of State. According to Executive Order 13584 the CSCC’s 
mission is to:  
coordinate, orient, and inform Government-wide public communications 
activities directed at audiences abroad and targeted against violent 
extremists and terrorist organizations, especially al-Qa’ida and its 
affiliates and adherents, with the goal of using communication tools to 
reduce radicalization by terrorists and extremist violence and terrorism 
that threaten the interests and national security of the United States.84  
This was reinforced by the issuance of Executive Order 13721, five years later in 2016, 
which renamed the CSCC as the Global Engagement Center (GEC) and restated the 
mission as “[The GEC] shall lead the coordination, integration, and synchronization of 
Government-wide communications activities directed at foreign audiences abroad in 
order to counter the messaging and diminish the influence of international terrorist 
organizations.”85 86 This mission and this organization were assigned to be the missing 
link to successfully synchronize influence operations at the strategic level. But, for many 
reasons, the CSCC/GEC has not been able to be the strategic integrator of influence 
operations. 
When the CSCC was established, in 2011, it had the support of senior government 
officials within President Obama’s administration. At the time, Secretary of State Hillary 
Clinton said, “it was vital to diminish the appeal of terrorism, and the CSCC was focused 
on undermining terrorist propaganda and dissuading potential recruits.”87 However, 
despite support from senior administration officials, the CSCC was never provided the 
necessary resources or authority to accomplish the goal of coordinating and integrating 
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across the U.S. Government’s efforts in the communications arena. An article from The 
Washington Post cites a miniscule budget, bureaucratic politics, and the need for all 
products to be officially attributed to the U.S. as impediments to achieving success.88 
Here again, with the lack of resourcing, we see the difference between statements made 
by senior officials about the importance of influence operations and what is (or is not) 
done to turn their words into reality. 
In his comments during a hearing on the Department of State’s efforts to combat 
ISIS propaganda online, Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, the 
Honorable Edward Royce, acknowledges that little has changed with the rebranding of 
the CSCC as the GEC. “The United States is losing the information war to terrorists like 
ISIS and Hezbollah.  Earlier this year, the administration rebranded the office responsible 
for counter messaging, but little seems to have changed.”89  
C. DEMAND SIGNAL FOR DOMINANCE IN THE INFORMATION 
ENVIRONMENT  
It is apparent that while the Departments of Defense and State have a stake in 
operating within the information environment, both struggle to secure the confidence of 
senior officials to win the information war. Hillary Clinton in 2011 appeared before a 
U.S. Senate Appropriations Committee and said, “[The U.S. is] in an information war … 
[and we need to] try to figure out how we’re going to win the information war.”90 Four 
years later Representative Royce voiced concerns during a committee hearing about the 
need to reform the Voice of America to combat Russia’s information campaigns. In 2014 
the House passed HR4490, a bill to enhance the missions, objectives, and effectiveness of 
                                                 
88 Scott Miller and Scott Higham, “In a Propaganda War against ISIS, the U.S. Tried to Play by the 
Enemy’s Rules,” Washington Post, May 8, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-
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2016. 
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the U.S. international communications,91 but the Senate never approved the bill. As 
Chairman Royce said: 
Right now, groups like ISIS, Putin, and Iran are “weaponizing” 
information to undermine regional stability and stoke violence. We’re on 
the defensive and failing to cut through the misinformation with facts. By 
clarifying the BBG’s mission, creating accountable leadership, and 
reducing the bureaucracy, more of the agency’s budget can be spent 
countering foreign propaganda—and not on Washington bureaucrats. … 
We don’t have the luxury of minor tweaks; this legislation responds to the 
need for complete overhaul.92 
As Ranking Member Engel has put it:  
During the Cold War, the Voice of America, Radio Free Europe, and other 
U.S.-backed broadcasters were the global gold standard for transmitting 
honest, unbiased news around the world. Today, the need for that 
information is just as great. Authoritarian governments and extremist 
groups are flooding airwaves and covering websites with propaganda and 
misinformation. Modern technologies have provided new avenues for 
disseminating lies and distortions to massive audiences. Unfortunately, 
America’s ability to respond effectively hasn’t kept pace. It’s time to 
breathe new life into American international broadcasting by modernizing 
and streamlining the BBG. I’m proud to cosponsor this legislation with 
Chairman Royce and I’m eager to push forward with these needed 
reforms.93  
However, what not even HR 4490 includes is how the current messaging 
capabilities within the Department of State and Defense will be synchronized to ensure 
that a consistent tone is emanated to achieve the desired effects. This lack of coordination 
at the departmental level makes it especially difficult for organizations, such as the Army 
or SOF commands to delineate the role of Army PSYOP. 
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To influence foreign target audiences requires more than just agencies across the 
government being able to conduct influence operations in support of their operational and 
tactical needs. Consequently, even if reorganization and reassignment of DOD influence 
forces were to occur, that would not suffice. Continuous coordination across the 
interagency would be required to prevent information fratricide. This challenge again 
points to the need for a whole-of-government approach when it comes to dominating the 
information environment. Ideally, such an approach would allow for Army PSYOP to 
pursue specified objectives and effects in concert with other agencies. In addition, 
confusion that exists in defining roles and responsibilities also needs to be cleared up.  
According to Carnes Lord, American public diplomacy today is “lamentable” due 
to poor funding, organizational ineffectiveness, and an overall lack of guidance.94 
Restricting the U.S.’s ability to strategically influence or message foreign target 
audiences to just the tactical level is unacceptable.  Both the Departments of State and 
Defense have buried their influence organizations and artificially separated their ability to 
effectively support influence operations at strategic and operational levels. Lord suggests 
reinstituting the USIA as a means of redress to support “US foreign policy, not simply 
American diplomacy; it should work cooperatively with every agency of the U.S. 
government that has significant overseas presence or interests.”95 Ultimately, Lord 
argues for an organization that is not rendered inept through bureaucracy, so that it can 
effectively support the development, synchronization, and dissemination of a coherent 
government-wide narrative to support strategic influence operations. Such an 
organization would serve to bridge the gap between department-level messaging 
guidance and the PSYOP entities responsible for planning and executing operations. It 
would also coordinate the efforts of various agencies and ensure consistency across 
regions and over time, something that standard military procedures make difficult.  
                                                 
94 Carnes Lord, “Reorganizing for Public Diplomacy,” in Information Strategy and Warfare: A Guide 
to Theory and Practice, ed. John Arquilla and Douglas A Borer (New York: Routledge, 2007), 113. 
95 Ibid., 123. 
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IV. CURRENT STATE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS 
A. MISMATCH OF STRATEGY AND POLICY EXECUTION 
Dr. Anthony H. Cordesman, Chairman of the Center for Strategic & International 
Studies, points to how the lack of a clear strategy in dealing with Operation Inherent 
Resolve, the fight against ISIS, is detrimental to focusing efforts on degrading 
organizations like ISIS.96 Dr. Cordesman calls for an overarching strategy supported 
through strategic communication initiatives. He posits that ISIS would flounder if the 
U.S. targeted the fact that the Islamic state is not based on the religious values which it 
proclaims.97 Echoing ideas voiced by Colonel Van de Velde and others, Dr. Cordesman 
recommends developing a clear and coherent strategy and identifying a single entity to 
control the informational component of national power.98 99 
As Philip Seib writes, “Information warfare requires an infrastructure of 
broadcasting, social media, and other communication assets that can direct messages”100 
He also argues that the credibility of the message tends to be more effective when the 
message is disseminated through the host nation media.101 Currently, efforts to compete 
against countries like Russia and China, as well as non-state terrorist organizations 
operating in the information environment, remain a struggle, as does the development of 
an effective information strategy. In his conclusion to Information Strategy and Warfare: 
A Guide to Theory and Practice, Douglas Borer notes that there is a pressing need for the 
United States Government to reverse its previous “information disarmament,” if the U.S. 
is to defeat our opponents’ operational and informational advantage.102 The consistent 
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message is that a U.S. government agency needs to take the lead in managing the 
information realm a la USIA.  
Dr. Waller pushes these arguments a step further. He wants individuals within the 
PSYOP community, to be the “thought-leaders” in developing a strategy against the 
global jihadist movement.103 In his view, PSYOP is a critical component of Information 
Operations, but has remained as an “after-thought, rather than part of the strategic core” 
in the fight against terrorism for way too long.104 He agrees with Colonel Van de Velde 
that the lack of leadership or an office responsible for coordinating information strategy 
is detrimental.105 He also highlights how DOD fails to define “psychological strategy,” 
and therefore renders the PSYOP capability effective only at the “tactical-operational 
level.”106  
In short, there is growing sentiment in the academic community in favor of 
removing the information warfare training wheels and reorganizing efforts to be more 
cost effective, less time consuming, and more strategically oriented than those found in 
the current protracted war efforts. Arguably, such efforts point to PSYOP being the DOD 
entity that should have primacy on behalf of these efforts in the field. 
B. SENTIMENTS ABOUT INFLUENCE OPERATIONS: IMPACTS TO 
PSYOP 
Influence operations throughout history have played a prominent role in military 
operations, but the military continually defaults to conducting kinetic operations. As 
demonstrated in Chapter II, the historical prominence given to influence operations has 
fluctuated. In recent years, we have witnessed an increase in demand for influence 
operations when countering the actions of non-state actors like ISIS, Al-Qaeda, the 
Taliban, and other non-traditional adversaries who compete in the information 
environment (IE). During a 2007 speech, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates quoted 
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Richard Holbrooke, a former State Department official, as asking: “how [can] the leading 
country in communications get out communicated by a man in a cave?”107 As Gates went 
on to remark, he did not associate speed and agility with U.S. strategic communication 
efforts; in saying this he was voicing his considerable frustrations.108 
One explanation for the continual ebb and flow of importance given to influence 
operations throughout recent U.S. history is that some in a democracy feel there is a 
certain underhandedness or unethical behavior associated with using influence 
operations, specifically psychological operations, and they do not feel the U.S. should be 
party to such activities. One consequence is that this attitude limits our government’s 
willingness to utilize PSYOP, a critical component of influence operations.109 Others 
suggest that simply through the use of the term War on Terror we have limited our ability 
to develop alternative solutions.110 Regardless, military leaders over the past 15 years 
have preferred using conventional and direct action methods, eschewing a more non-
kinetic approach. 
What might this all mean for PSYOP? The Department of Defense has struggled 
with dominating the IE, yet has been directed to develop a strategy for operating in the 
IE. With a whole-of-government approach, psychological operations could play a 
significant role by helping to integrate DOD operations across the IE. 
C. PSYOP AS A BRANCH: BURDENED WITH CHANGE 
The U.S. Army Psychological Operations Branch was established in 2006 both in 
response to Al-Qaeda’s influential information campaign to erode the U.S. government’s 
“just war” footing and to augment the U.S. government’s efforts in two theaters of 
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operation.111 PSYOP was an existing capability with a lineage reaching back to WWII, 
but, prior to 2006, was considered a functional area rather than a career branch. PSYOP 
was developed, and is still expected today, to synchronize messaging efforts across the 
range of military operations and at every level of warfare from tactical to strategic. 
To better understand why PSYOP soldiers should be entrusted with the task of 
synchronizing messaging efforts for tactical operations, as well as regionally for DOD, it 
is important to understand the selection, training, and education that goes into making the 
profession’s practitioners. PSYOP soldiers must meet a series of rigorous requirements to 
join the Psychological Operations Regiment. All PSYOP soldiers and officers complete a 
specially designed assessment and selection program to ensure that they possess the 
requisite character traits, and are: intelligent, physically fit, and able to perform under 
physical and mental pressure.112 Once selected, PSYOP soldiers attend an extensive 36-
week qualification course that familiarizes them with media production, message 
dissemination management, regionally focused language and culture training, and the 
psychological effects of military activities.113 Some are further selected to attend 
advanced programs at the Naval Postgraduate School, National Defense University, 
Naval War College, etc., or they conduct training with industry.  
In addition to developing a training pipeline to select and train uniquely qualified 
individuals, the new PSYOP branch has also dealt with struggles like the splitting of the 
active and reserve forces into separate elements.114 As highlighted by Brigadier General 
Van Roosen, both Civil Affairs (CA) and Psychological Operations regiments were 
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impacted by what some refer to as the “Great Divorce” of active duty and reserve PSYOP 
and CA personnel. Because the reserve components of the two regiments were viewed as 
an administrative burden on the U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) 
staff, they were shunted away to form the U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological 
Operations Command (USACAPOC), a two-star headquarters under the U.S. Army 
Reserve Command. USACAPOC provides over 80 percent of the Civil Affairs and 
Psychological Operations forces to support Army and Joint operations.  Beyond this split 
between active and reserve forces which generates command challenges, the training and 
selection for reserve CA and PSYOP soldiers also differs and leads to a capability gap.115  
Shortly after the establishment of the new branch, the U.S. government 
announced the need for the surge in Iraq.  As the importance of influence operations 
grew, the branch maintained a semblance of homeostasis and a sense of autonomy. 
However, in 2010, due to what U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) 
spokesman Ken McGraw described as “foreign and domestic sensitivities to the term 
‘psychological’” operations, the branch endured another course correction with a name 
change for its core mission.116 The Army changed the name of the branch’s operations 
from Psychological Operations to Military Information Support Operations (MISO). 
While the career branch title remained PSYOP, the activities of the branch and its 
organizations were referred to as MISO. Despite the name change, there was never a 
concomitant adjustment to the PSYOP regiment’s mission or to the operations conducted 
by its practitioners.  
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In August 2011, the importance of PSYOP branch within USASOC was reflected 
by the establishment of a second Military Information Support Group to assist in the 
management of its seven operational battalions.117 Additionally, the Army provisionally 
established a one-star level command, the Military Information Support Operations 
Command (MISOC), at the same time as the 8th Military Information Support Group.118  
However, just as the PSYOP branch began to rise in importance and gain 
prominence at the operational and strategic levels, through the addition of a one-star 
command and a second operational Group level command, PSYOP suffered yet another 
change. In 2014, the MISOC’s two operational Groups, 4th and 8th Military Information 
Support Groups, were absorbed into the newly created 1st Special Forces Command 
(Airborne) (see Figure 3). The MISOC headquarters positions were transformed so as to 
support the development of a new headquarters designed to better synchronize and 
coordinate global special operations support; the MISOC itself ended up being 
short-lived.119  
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Figure 3.  Army SOF Reorganization to 1st Special Forces Command120 
According to a draft document for the 2016 DOTMLPF realignment of Special 
Forces Command and the MISOC,  
The ARSOF [Army Special Operations Forces] reorganization of MIS 
[military information support] force structure will increase organizational 
effectiveness; enhance influence capabilities across ARSOF; offer 
versatility across the operational spectrum; and enable USASOC to 
provide requirements-focused capabilities to TSOC [Theater Special 
Operations Command], Geographic Combatant Commands (GCC), Joint 
Forces, and Other Government Agencies (OGA). These capabilities 
include scalable tailored combinations of regionally aligned, globally 
responsive Special Operations Forces (SOF) to enable joint operations. 
When synchronized, these capabilities provide a seamless and persistent 
SOF capability supporting actions aimed at influencing Diplomatic, 
Informational, Military, Economic, Financial, Intelligence, and Law 
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Enforcement (DIME-FIL) instruments of national power and providing 
Senior Leaders improved insights into the human domain.121  
However, through the act of combining the ARSOF regiments (Civil Affairs, 
Psychological Operations, and Special Forces) under the same command the 
representative voice that should have been allocated to each individual ARSOF regiment 
at the one-star level became unnecessarily limited.  
D. ORGANIZATIONAL POSITIONING OF PSYOP: NOT A POSITION OF 
PROMINENCE  
Quite often, the CA, PSYOP, and SF regiments work towards very similar goals 
and display Unity of Effort. Each regiment utilizes very similar approaches for achieving 
tactical level effects (i.e., understanding the target language and culture, working in small 
teams, and employing specially trained and selected individuals). However, they still 
need to be recognized as three separate and distinct entities. Colonel Alfred Paddock’s 
chapter in Political Warfare and Psychological Operations, Rethinking the U.S. 
Approach, cites comments by Colonel Donald P. Hall, who feared that psychological and 
unconventional warfare would be hindered under a singular command because the 
controlling commander would give more attention to the organization from which he 
came and which he understood better.122 Essentially, Colonel Hall was warning future 
forces in 1952 about the dangers in violating Unity of Effort through the employment of 
Unity of Command (see Figure 4 and Figure 5).123  
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Figure 4.  USASOC Organization Prior to 1st Special Forces Command 
  
Figure 5.  USASOC Organization with 1st Special Forces Command 
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It seems that Colonel Hall understood that each entity needs an independent and 
equal voice. Paddock further reinforces Hall’s reservations by pointing out that in “such 
an organizational environment, even the most conscientious PSYOP staff officer has had 
difficulty giving his full attention to the broader responsibilities of psychological 
operations rather than those oriented toward special operations.”124 With PSYOP and 
Civil Affairs today integrated within 1st Special Forces Command, there is an inherent 
risk of their losing sight of operations that should be conducted beyond just addressing 
the CG’s immediate tactical needs.  
 All three “tribes”—CA, PSYOP, and SF—have many reasons to coordinate and 
cooperate. But simply combining the three organizations under “one hand” without each 
having an equivalent voice at the General Officer, one-star level, limits their ability to 
represent their capabilities themselves at higher levels, and beyond just SOF in the 
DOD.125  
Indeed, the idea that a single “Generalist” officer can adequately and equitably 
represent all three sets of regimental capabilities when his experiences came from within 
only one regiment leaves many PSYOP professionals skeptical. For example, having a 
Psychological Operations officer speak on behalf of the Special Forces regiment to 
Congress would doubtless invite scrutiny not only from within the SF community, but 
also from without. The PSYOP representative would lack the operational expertise and 
firsthand knowledge to be able to convey SF’s needs, and might not be able to articulate 
as well as a Green Beret how SF should be properly employed to members of Congress.   
SF operators would also have to worry that a PSYOP General might depict SF as 
enablers to Psychological Operations. Our intent here is not to criticize Generals who 
have represented PSYOP to Congress recently, but instead to simply point to a truism: 
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everyone is likelier to be passionate about what they know best, and biases are not always 
conscious. 
While serial organizational changes, changes in naming conventions, and efforts 
to fuse independent ARSOF organizations have limited PSYOP’s role at the strategic 
level, the lack of a published strategy has also been a factor 
E. ADMINISTRATIVE REQUIREMENTS LIMIT OPTIMAL 
OPERATIONAL UTILITY 
Over the past 15 years, with continuous operations throughout Iraq, Afghanistan, 
and over 100 additional locations around the world, frequent deployments have taken a 
significant toll on ARSOF.  Political and military leaders alike have made efforts to ease 
the burden on service members and their families, but this has created new problems 
related to continuity when deployed units rotate as frequently as they do. It is difficult to 
manage any kind of long-term plan when the units responsible for executing it deploy for 
only six to nine months at a time. 
Recently, deployment cycles, other than to combat zones, have been limited to 
179 days or less throughout SOCOM.126 Limiting the amount of time in operational 
environment (OE), never mind the same OE, diminishes the ability to provide persistent 
oversight for long-term influence operations.127 The repeated turnover of manpower, and 
individuals not returning to the same OE, also limits the acquisition of regional 
knowledge and awareness concerning the impacts of ongoing influence operations in 
supporting U.S. Embassy and DOD goals and objectives.  An additional operational side 
effect results in PSYOP personnel planning and conducting influence efforts that are 
aimed at achieving near-term tactical impacts with minimal effects on the long-term 
strategic efforts. The pressure to produce results to achieve a “successful” deployment 
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stacks the deck in favor of measures of performance rather than measures of 
effectiveness, though shortened deployments are not the only inhibiting factor impacting 
continuity of effort.  
Individuals must move through certain army/branch key developmental (KD) 
positions to be considered for promotion.128 To stay competitive often requires 
individuals to be reassigned to positions that no longer allow them to return to the same 
OE. These requirements prevent officers from being able to acquire deep regional 
knowledge. Although there have been attempts to lengthen operational availability of 
SOF officers through the creation of the Special Operations Captain’s Career Course, its 
effects still fall short of redressing all of the operational shortfalls created by excessive 
churn.129 Together, shortened deployments, career pressures, and the need to move 
through KD positions work against PSYOP professionals being able to execute policy as 
effectively as they otherwise should.  
F. CONCLUSION 
The dissolution of the MISOC denies USASOC a command that could have 
played a significant role in coordinating and synchronizing interagency efforts, as well as 
advising the USASOC and SOCOM commanders on the effective integration of PSYOP 
into the whole-of-government approach. This is counter to the importance integration has 
been given in testimony to the HASC subcommittee. Additionally, abolition of the 
MISOC limits the ability for Psychological Operations to have a General Officer with the 
resident expertise to provide policy input at the right levels to political and military 
leaders. Meanwhile, to develop a system in which the influence of foreign target 
audiences is at the forefront of operations, and does not solely come from the tip of a gun 
barrel, means that regional commanders and staffs need to have that capability within 
reach.  
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V. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The need to refine, reorganize, or transform the U.S. government’s influence 
capabilities is not a novel concept. George Creel, Elmer Davis, and Edward Bernays all 
made recommendations over the years for organizations to replace or revitalize the CPI, 
OWI, or USIA. Recently, academics like Carnes Lord, Sebastian Gorka, and Hy 
Rothstein have written about the need to transform the U.S. government’s role in the 
information environment.130 However, this thesis has been geared towards the discussion 
of how one agency, the Department of Defense, can play a more effective role within the 
information environment by using PSYOP to better effect.  
During a 2016 Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) directed study, the co-authors 
participated in discussions that led the group to develop concepts to enhance success and 
overcome shortcomings in how PSYOP forces are structured and operationally 
employed. The NPS group identified four impediments to PSYOP mission success that 
held true regardless of the mission setting. 
The first is that the bulk of the responsibility for planning, developing, executing, 
and evaluating PSYOP activities lies at the lowest echelon, the team level. PSYOP teams, 
which by doctrine are typically led by a captain or a senior NCO, take guidance from 
existing operational orders, but are themselves responsible for fleshing out and achieving 
the desired effects or objectives of the plan. In addition, the team must develop 
supporting objectives, analyze potential target audiences, and devise assessment plans. 
These are just some of the things the team must do in what is just the first phase of a 
seven-step process (as indicated in Figure 6.) 
                                                 
130 Lord, “Reorganizing for Public Diplomacy”; Sebastian L. Gorka and the ThreatKnowledgeGroup, 
eds, The Islamic State and Information Warfare: Defeating ISIS and the Broader Global Jihadist 
Movement, ThreatKnowledgeGroup, January 2015. http://threatknowledge.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/11/TKG-Report-ISIS-Info-Warfare.pdf; Hy S. Rothstein, “Strategy and 
Psychological Operations,” in Information Strategy and Warfare: A Guide to Theory and Practice, ed. John 
Arquilla and Douglas A Borer (New York: Routledge, 2007), 160–86. 
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Figure 6.  Seven-Phase PSYOP Process131 
The next steps of the process require: in-depth analysis of the target audiences and 
the most effective methods to reach them; development of the discrete messaging actions 
that will reach the audience; and design of the products (visual, audio, and/or audio-
visual) that will deliver the message. These are the parts of the process that call upon the 
SOF operators’ cultural, linguistic, and regional knowledge developed through training 
and experience. All of the work conducted by the team in the initial phases goes into a 
packet for review and approval by higher echelons. Following approval, which will be 
discussed in detail below, the team oversees the production, distribution, and 
dissemination of its products, then conducts assessments to evaluate the effectiveness of 
its efforts. Many other elements support the PSYOP process, but the team bears the brunt 
of responsibility for ensuring that all steps are conducted thoroughly and completely. 
Bottom line: currently, the team represents the fulcrum of operations for PSYOP. 
The second impediment the NPS study identified is short deployment cycles. The 
tools and techniques PSYOP employs to induce behavior change cannot achieve those 
                                                 
131 United States Army Special Warfare Center and School, Psychological Operations Leaders 
Planning Guide (GTA 33-01-001) (Ft. Bragg, NC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2005). 
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changes overnight. The process described above takes time; it takes time to conduct 
research, analysis, and administrative actions. Yet, teams tasked with conducting these 
activities are limited to six-month-long deployments, which is far too little time to see a 
program through from beginning to end. The resulting lack of continuity is devastating. 
In one instance, described to the NPS group, a team in West Africa spent a considerable 
portion of its deployment researching and developing a five-year program for its assigned 
country; three years later, when another participant in the NPS study was assigned to that 
same area, none of the work the earlier team had begun was being continued. Nor is this 
an isolated example. 
The detailed work necessary to plan and develop PSYOP activities suffers greatly 
from multiple changeovers among teams; even the best transition plan cannot transfer six 
months of researched understanding. The PSYOP community has tried to address this 
challenge by encouraging contact between outgoing and incoming teams and by 
emphasizing reachback capabilities which connect stateside assets with deployed 
teams.132 However, maintaining a continuity of effort across multiple teams over the 
course of multiple transitions and personnel changes over a period of years remains a 
challenge. 
A third hurdle is administrative: it takes too long to implement a PSYOP program 
thanks to a multi-tiered message approval process. Guidance regarding the themes of 
PSYOP messages is taken from Geographic Combatant Command (GCC) or theater-level 
plans and orders, but the messages themselves are developed a few echelons lower, by 
the PSYOP team itself. Situations vary, but a typical approval chain consists of a PSYOP 
element just above the team’s level that reviews the proposed message or product first, 
before it goes to a SOF task force or forward element, then a theater-level SOF 
command, and then a GCC. Because the proposal packet may have to go through staffing 
processes at each level, there can be needless, sometimes very detrimental, delays in 
approval of time-sensitive products. Here we do not mean to suggest that the PSYOP 
process should not fit into overall strategy or that PSYOP should not be coordinated with 
                                                 
132 Joint Publication 1-02 defines reachback as “The process of obtaining products, services, and 
applications, or forces, or equipment, or material from organizations that are not forward deployed.” 
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other ongoing operations, but that the inclusion in the staffing process of individuals 
unfamiliar with psychological operations sometimes results in delays as PSYOP 
personnel respond to inquiries or challenges from well-intentioned, but uninformed, 
colleagues.133  
The final impediment identified by the NPS study group was the difficulty in 
linking PSYOP programs and series to an overarching national strategy, a challenge that 
is strained by organizational structures. As mentioned previously, the U.S. government 
struggles with maintaining a consistent narrative focus, and since the end of the Cold War 
and the dissolution of the USIA, lacks a good mechanism for doing so. Military 
commanders, and especially those in SOF, must pay attention to the human domain and 
develop messaging strategies for their areas of responsibility. Combatant commands and 
their subordinate echelons regularly cite PSYOP themes they want stressed as well as 
themes to avoid in their annexes to their operations orders, but these themes are 
developed to achieve operational and tactical effects rather than to support a national-
level narrative or strategy. This can lead to disjointed, perhaps even contradictory 
messaging, which is damaging to U.S. credibility. When coupled with the impediments 
described above    PSYOP responsibilities being pushed to the lowest level, and overly 
short deployment cycles    this lack of a strategic narrative ensures that the United States 
will struggle to win an information war.  
These four obstacles    the overburdening of the PSYOP teams, short-duration 
deployments resulting in a lack of continuity, a cumbersome approval process, and lack 
of an overarching strategic narrative    combine to make the already challenging task of 
inducing behavior change in an often resistant target audience even more difficult. In 
order to overcome these obstacles, we would offer several recommendations, all of which 
would be greatly enhanced if the U.S. Government developed an independent 
organization legally authorized and adequately funded to synchronize influence 
operations. 
                                                 
133 The authors do not intend to convey a “you wouldn’t understand, so trust us” attitude. However, if 
one considers PSYOP a weapons system that can be used to achieve a desired effect, we would submit that 
commanders or staff officers would not let their laymen’s understanding of the workings of an artillery 
battery or an aircraft’s weapons system delay their approval of the use of that system to achieve an effect. 
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B. RECOMMENDATION ONE: MISOC REACTIVATION PROVIDES 
INFLUENCE OVERSIGHT IN DOD 
Our first recommendation is comprised of three critical adjustments. By making 
use of PSYOP operational experience, it would place the Psychological Operations 
Regiment at a level of prominence and grant it the voice requisite to enable it to assist in 
shaping DOD influence policy (see Figure 7).   
 
Figure 7.  Recommendation One, MISOC Reactivation 
Adjustment #1 would reestablish the MISOC, remove PSYOP from within 1st 
SFC (A), and place it back under USASOC as a one-star command. As discussed in 
Chapter IV, PSYOP is and should remain an independent organization commanded by a 
Psychological Operations officer.134 135 Subordinating PSYOP organizations to another 
branch’s command unduly restricts PSYOP’s potential. Allowing the Regiment to remain 
as an independent unit would grant it the voice it needs at the national level, represented 
by an individual who has the requisite institutional, organizational, and operational 
experience.  
                                                 
134 Paddock, “Military Psychological Operations.” 
135 It could be argued that since MISOC’s inception in 2011 the warning from Colonel Hall from 1952 
has been violated because the MISOC was only commanded by Special Forces officers. 
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Under this rubric, the MISOC should also be willing to accept additional 
responsibility for all of the army’s PSYOP forces, which includes the reserve component. 
It is commonly recognized within the Army and the Special Operations community that 
reserve and active component PSYOP forces do not provide the same operational 
capability. This is in large part due to differences in their training pipelines. This should 
not be used, however, to pardon the active component from being responsible for 
providing oversight of PSYOP across army operations  
Consequently, Adjustment #2 would make the MISOC the organizational 
oversight mechanism for all active and reserve component psychological operations 
units. The current organization construct of 1st Special Forces Command overseeing 
active PSYOP, and USACAPOC overseeing reserve PSYOP, places psychological 
operations capabilities under two different commands. The MISOC should command, 
synchronize, and employ both active and reserve PSYOP forces to support SOF and 
Conventional Force (CF) integration. Current existing operational relationships of active 
duty PSYOP forces working with SOF and reserve PSYOP forces working with CF could 
remain the same.   
The final adjustment, Adjustment #3, is internal to the PSYOP regiment. It 
addresses many of the issues raised by the NPS study group, and recommends an 
alternate division of labor for the seven phase PSYOP process. As discussed earlier, the 
bulk of the responsibility for each step of the process except for V (approval) currently 
rests with the lowest echelon, the team. Our proposed change would place senior PSYOP 
personnel at the TSOCs as the primary stakeholders for phases I–V. These experienced 
personnel would be responsible for the planning of PSYOP programs and for their 
integration with higher-echelon plans. The teams would continue to participate in phases 
I–V, but their primary role would be to interact with the target audience and local 
partners. The team’s main responsibility would be to execute phases VI and VII. This 
would address the issue of the least experienced PSYOP officers being the primary 
planners for influence operations, and would place more experienced (and vetted) 
individuals in positions of responsibility for developing the plans to be executed by the 
teams.  The teams would thus be freed to focus on how to apply the regional plan to their 
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specific operational environment. The teams would also be spared the heavy 
administrative tasks associated with the development of a PSYOP program. To succeed, 
of course, this adjustment would require frequent, open, and bi-directional interaction 
between the teams on the ground and the planners at the theater-level headquarters. 
Meanwhile, the realignments we have just described do not address the disparity 
in training received by reserve and active component PSYOP forces. Secondly, the 
realignments might reopen old wounds associated with the management of reserve forces 
by the active component and the unique administrative challenges associated with reserve 
units, though both drawbacks can be mitigated if not fully resolved. 
The disparity in training can be eased through the integration of reservists as 
individual augmentees during periods of heighted operational tempo to enable reserve 
soldiers to work with and gain experience from the active forces. Additionally, reserve 
forces could be employed as surplus planning and series execution teams during their two 
weeks of annual training. Incorporating the reserve forces in these two simple ways 
would assist in homogenizing reserve and active forces’ capabilities via shared 
experiences. Relationships would also be strengthened and important knowledge shared. 
Lastly, the management of the reserve forces would be undertaken by a command 
subordinate to USASOC rather than by separate units which has led to frustrations in the 
USASOC staff.136 For example, “transferring the USAR SOF units would be a welcome 
method by which to reduce the requirement to support conventional forces and rid the 
command of the challenge of managing USAR units with their separate funding 
requirements and the historical problems of keeping a reserve component command 
combat ready.”137 
A consolidated list of advantages and disadvantages for Recommendation One 
follows: 
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• Allows the PSYOP Regiment to remain as an independent capability with 
a representative at the General Officer level who has the requisite 
operational and institutional experience 
• Ensures consistency of regional messaging and PSYOP efforts (active and 
reserve forces) 
• Allows the team to focus on developing a better cultural understanding 
and relieved of administrative burdens 
• Provides the team more of an opportunity to interact with the population 
• Increases the consistency of PSYOP efforts during shortened deployment 
cycles when phases I–V are managed at the TSOC level 
• Limits the tendency for confirmation bias when the team is not responsible 
for creating the PSYOP series and program (the team is only responsible 
for phases VI and VII)  




• Potential for the plan developed by TSOC planners during phases I–V to 
not fit the operational environment 
• Potential for the PSYOP team to seem disconnected from understanding 
the population when not primarily responsible for phases I–V 
• Potential for TSOC PSYOP planners to not allow the team autonomy to 
execute the TSOC plan in the most operationally effective way 
• Potential for TSOC PSYOP planners to ignore the operator on the ground 
because the planners feel they already have the “right” answer 




C. RECOMMENDATION TWO: RETURN TO INTELLIGENCE ROOTS 
AND EMULATE THE FAO CONSTRUCT 
Our second recommendation is more revolutionary. Many of the criticisms made 
of the PSYOP community both internally and externally have to do with: lack of 
continuity between teams; failure to routinely deploy organic teams on more than one 
rotation together; inability to conduct long-term influence operations; effectiveness only 
at the tactical-operational level, but not at the strategic level; lack of ability by PSYOP to 
provide measures of effectiveness (MOE).138 139 As PSYOP stakeholders, we would say 
these are legitimate challenges faced by PSYOP professionals on a regular basis. Here is 
where the call to return PSYOP to its intelligence roots offers several opportunities that 
would allow PSYOP to be more effective in executing influence operations. For this we 
borrow from the FAO construct (Figure 8). 
 
Figure 8.  Recommendation Two, FAO Construct 
                                                 
138 Waller, “Designing an Information Warfare Campaign,” 52. 
139 Rothstein, “Strategy and Psychological Operations.” 
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Recommendation Two consists of removing the PSYOP branch, both active and 
reserve forces, completely from USSOCOM and placing it as a subordinate directorate 
within the Defense Intelligence Agency. Reassigning PSYOP to the intelligence 
community would allow PSYOP to address a significant weakness: assessing PSYOP 
effectiveness or MOE. As Rothstein and others argue, the effects from PSYOP activities 
will never be as obvious as those from kinetic operations, so assessing their impact is 
more difficult than is assessing typical battle damage.140 Re-integrating PSYOP back into 
the intelligence community, its original World War I and II–era home, would benefit both 
communities. Closer integration with intelligence analysts would enable the development 
of more refined and targeted psychological operations, while the close contact of PSYOP 
personnel with their target audiences and local populations would generate information to 
be assessed for intelligence purposes. By providing atmospherics about populations 
around the world, PSYOP could help corroborate or refute information and assessments 
from other intelligence sources.  
PSYOP’s placement as a subordinate directorate in the DIA would mean PSYOP 
would need to follow something like the Foreign Area Officer (FAO) model, whereby 
PSYOP personnel could hold permanent positions in U.S. embassies around the world. 
This would allow PSYOP the ability to develop a more methodical approach to influence 
operations versus fulfilling immediate gratification taskers designed to demonstrate 
progress during overly short deployments. Under this recommendation, PSYOP officers 
and noncommissioned Officers (NCOs) would move to select U.S. embassies through a 
permanent change of station (PCS). The embassies would be those deemed integral by 
the national influence strategy.  
Deploying PSYOP forces in this FAO-like fashion would provide several 
advantages. As permanent parties in U.S. embassies throughout the world, PSYOP 
personnel can better integrate with U.S. public diplomacy efforts. Better long-term 
influence effects would come from a single team maintaining a persistent presence rather 
than efforts being interrupted by frequent team and personnel rotations. U.S. 
                                                 
140  Arquilla and Borer, Information Strategy and Warfare. 
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Ambassadors would also find themselves with more mature and knowledgeable PSYOP 
practitioners, because in the new system PSYOP professionals would first work under 
more experienced leaders who would help them understand the country team and how to 
better integrate with it. Ideally, PSYOP professionals would no longer be responsible for 
strategic influence on their first rotation, but instead, by working under more experienced 
PSYOP professionals, would gain valuable insights into the real world application of 
influence activities, develop a better understanding of regional and cultural nuances, and 
develop a better understanding of how to focus influence operations regionally. Taken 
together, this should also mean that U.S. ambassadors should have less to worry about in 
accepting a PSYOP team. 
A consolidated list of advantages and disadvantages for Recommendation Two 
follows: 
Advantages:   
• Establishes a persistent presence and partnership with the U.S. Embassy 
and Department of State to support Public Diplomacy efforts 
• Develops a truly regionally and culturally adept PSYOP operator 
• Minimizes the 179 day turnovers between teams 
• Allows for the establishment of long-term professional relationships with 
DOS officials, interagency partners, host nation partners, NGOs, and 
others that maintain a persistent presence within the operational 
environment 
• Increases the ability to collect relevant measures of effectiveness. Enables 
seeing a PSYOP series through from start to finish over the course of 
years, which will assist in the observation of the behavioral changes in the 
target audience 
• Would generate valuable information for the intelligence community 
regarding population sentiments 
• Could reduce the amount of manpower and sustainment resources needed 
when stationed forward as a part of the U.S. Embassy country team (i.e., 
no longer need to meet low density MOS requirements at Ft. Bragg to 
support the battalion and group administrative and logistics operations) 
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• Provides for better opportunities with OGAs that have established working 
relationships with the DoD intelligence community  
• Provides a better opportunity for PSYOP forces to develop junior officers 
through on-the-job-training by placing them as assistants within an 




• Means support to SOF and conventional forces will have to come from 
reserve PSYOP forces 
• Might result in loss of standing as a branch in conventional forces’ eyes 
Again, how best to operationalize these changes would be a suitable topic for further 
study. 
D. GREATER FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY: REDUCTION IN FORCE AND 
BUDGETS CALL FOR CREATIVITY 
Beyond the operational benefits, there would be fiscal advantages to 
implementing this recommendation. PSYOP would no longer need the large logistical 
support structure currently in place at Ft. Bragg, North Carolina (i.e., mechanics, signal, 
administrative support personnel). The only low-density logistical support needed would 
be for the reserve forces to support both SOF and conventional force combat 
deployments and training exercises. In addition, by maintaining a permanent team 
presence within U.S. embassies, PSYOP soldiers would no longer require such a 
substantial TDY budget. A PSYOP professional’s salary would instead be supplemented 
by a Cost of Living Allowance (COLA), which is typically less than TDY per diem. 
Finally, transportation costs for deploying and redeploying soldiers every six months 
would be reduced. Of course, a more rigorous cost-benefit analysis would need to be 
conducted, but from our perspective it seems that Recommendation Two offers fiscal and 
not just operational and strategic advantages.     
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Meanwhile, under this new rubric, the active and reserve components of PSYOP 
would be controlled by the Influence Directorate within DIA.141 This would not be 
totally cost-free. For instance, the removal of the active component from the 1st SFC (A) 
and USSOCOM overall could lead to SOF forces feeling that they are not being 
adequately supported, and therefore they might attempt to execute influence operations 
on their own.142 Also, political and military officials would need to be able to effectively 
overcome their inherent aversion to PSYOP. Otherwise, the idea of a permanent PSYOP 
presence will meet with rejection. 
E. CONCLUSION  
Two persistent problems plague PSYOP. The current method of employing 
PSYOP is not harnessing the full potential of PSYOP professionals. Second, PSYOP 
needs to be positioned and provided a place of prominence in order to maximize its 
practitioners’ capabilities. So long as the status quo remains unaltered, the Department of 
Defense’s influence efforts will achieve only tactical and operational level effects at best. 
Without seriously re-considering the role that PSYOP should play within the operational 
and strategic realm, and without more closely integrating influence undertaken by the 
Department of Defense with intelligence community efforts, the U.S. government risks 
remaining reactionary in the information environment.  
  
                                                 
141 In this situation, reserve forces could be utilized to augment vacancies within the active force at 
U.S. embassies.  If needed, active component PSYOP soldiers could be utilized to fill key planning billets 
to support conventional/SOF efforts if requested or if the billet could not be filled by reserve PSYOP forces 
due to a shortened operational availability. 
142 Matthew R. Wood, “Special Warfare: Restructuring for the Future” (master's thesis, Naval 
Postgraduate School, 2016). 
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